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ABSTRACT 
The surface warfare community has recently increased bonus amounts in an 
attempt to reward quality performance and retain superior officers. Simultaneously, the 
community has started to offer alternative programs and incentives that might appeal to 
those officers who desire a flexible career. We used survey information to determine 
which of these were the most appealing to the community in a way that might provide 
cost savings to the military when provided in conjunction with an auction bonus system. 
Using the standard bonus system compared to the uniform price auction, the Quality 
Adjusted Discount (QUAD) auction, and Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism 
(CRAM), we determined which would be most effective for maintaining quality officers 
in the community while meeting retention objectives and providing cost savings. 
We found that a quality auction system could provide cost savings as much 
as $1,850,000 or could increase costs by as much as $2,081,250, depending on 
community retention levels, even with increased individual bonus amounts. 
Additionally, from survey responses we were able to discern additional non-monetary 
incentives that surface warfare officers desire, which could be used to improve 
retention of quality officers in the future. 
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The intent of this thesis is to identify past retention habits based on offered 
bonuses and propose a structure for bonuses in the future, regarding both the monetary 
amount and the year of service offered in an effort to retain the appropriate number of 
high-quality officers in the surface warfare community. Additionally, intangible 
incentives are examined and attempts made to quantify them for future considerations for 
retention. 
The military faces a peculiar problem when maintaining skilled workers who have 
advanced through the ranks; unlike the civilian sector, the military cannot and does not 
use outside hiring techniques to compensate for retention problems within certain 
specialties and the management level. Rather, the military is forced to home-grow 
workers from the low rank, minimally trained level to the high rank, highly trained level. 
Because of this, retention in the military is aggressively tracked and mediated when 
necessary levels lag. 
Typically, retention problems are countered by offering monetary bonuses that 
require extended periods of service obligation. In the last decade, however, the 
Department of the Navy and the surface warfare community in particular have explored 
non-monetary incentives as a means of enticing quality officers to remain on active duty. 
Programs such as career intermission programs, graduate education, and alternate 
timelines for training have been implemented. 
While monetary bonuses remain a viable option for tempting surface warfare 
officers to stay within the community, the use of an auction system that takes into 
account a particular officer’s quality and desire to participate in alternate incentive 
programs could provide cost savings to the community. 
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B. PROBLEM 
Recent polls have found that the surface warfare community is “seeing an uptick 
in lieutenants leaving at their first opportunity, driving a historically low retention rate of 
around 35% even lower, indicating that a significant amount of talent in the surface 
warfare community walks out the door immediately following their first shore tour” 
(Snodgrass, 2014). We distributed a survey to junior surface warfare officers (SWOs) 
from the rank of ensign to lieutenant to analyze what factors drove officers to either 
remain or leave active duty. Historical data provided insight as to the quality of officer 
that chose to take previous versions of retention bonuses. 
The survey, distributed to current junior officers (both those who have taken 
retention bonuses and those who have not), asked participants to assess their personal 
valuation of non-monetary incentives and how it would change the amount they would 
bid for a monetary bonus in an auction system.  
C. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter II focuses on background material for understanding the traditional SWO 
career path, and the alternatives that are being offered as non-monetary incentives. 
Chapter III provides a background of auction systems and the potential applications to 
SWO retention bonuses. Chapter IV shows the background of the officer retention survey 
that was distributed as part of this thesis. Chapter V is the analysis and results of both 
historical data and the survey results. Chapter VI summarizes and concludes with 
recommendations for further study. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
This chapter defines the typical surface warfare officer career. Section A explains 
timing and qualification for a typical officer, as well as recent changes implemented by 
the Navy. This examination will help ascertain what elements constitute a high-quality 
officer that the Navy should want to retain. 
Section B discusses the monetary and non-monetary incentives offered during a 
career. The current system is explained, including the retention aims of the Surface 
Warfare community and if they are being met. 
A. SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER CAREER AND QUALIFICATION 
When considering the career of a SWO, one must always start at the initial 
training phase; newly commissioned officers cannot start the career timeline at a later 
point, meaning that the Navy must home-grow all SWOs rather than hiring experienced 
civilians to fill high-level positions.   
In an effort to determine which officers have the necessary qualifications to 
command a vessel later in their career, the Navy habitually evaluates performance and 
quality. Officers receive Fitness Reports (FITREPs) at least once every 15 months; either 
during the periodic month all members of their paygrade are reviewed, upon detachment 
from the command, or upon the detachment of the commanding officer (Chief of Naval 
Personnel, 2015, pp. 3-1 – 3-4). While all FITREPs have promotion recommendations, 
periodic and detaching of reporting senior FITREPs can provide additional comparison 
data, since officers of the same category are simultaneously ranked and have summary 
group information that individual scores can be viewed against.  
FITREPs are comprised of multiple metrics, including a cumulative point average 
of categories, a narrative paragraph, and recommendations for future employment. 
Though guidance is provided in BUPERSINST 1610.10 (series) and PERS-41, the 
reporting senior has latitude when writing reports. 
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1. Career Progression and Milestones 
Due to the practical necessity of developing future commanding officers from 
within the SWO community junior officer ranks, standard wickets, as well as unofficial 
ones, are required to prepare SWOs for potential future command. 
a. Initial Officer Training 
Typically, newly commissioned SWOs report to their ships on an interim basis 
before proceeding to basic division officer course. This eight week course covers basic 
shipboard knowledge and qualifications, and is the Surface Warfare Officer School initial 
training.  
b. First and Second Division Officer Tours 
Following basic division officer course (BDOC), SWOs report to their ship to 
begin their 24 month tour as Division Officers. Officers are assigned to a division based 
on empty positions; few billets require specialty training, so officers slated for those 
positions proceed to specialty schools prior to or following BDOC. 
During the first sea tour, officers are required to qualify SWO, including the 
prerequisite qualifications. The division officer job can be split into two aspects: 
divisional administration and watchstanding. Officers can pursue further qualification 
during their first sea tour, including Engineering Officer of the Watch (EOOW), Surface 
Warfare Coordinator (SUWC), or Command Duty Officer (CDO). 
Officers attend advanced division officer course between their first and second 
division officer tours (see Figure 1). This four-week course of instruction standardizes 
knowledge and builds on the officer’s initial tactical experience to prepare them for 
follow on sea tours. 
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Figure 1.  Legacy SWO Career Path. Source: Navy Personnel Command (2015). 
Second tour division officers receive specialized training depending on their 
assigned second tour job. As more advanced watchstanders, they continue to hone their 
first tour skills while continuing to work on advanced qualifications.  
c. First Shore Tour 
SWOs slate for their shore duty during their last year of sea duty. Some shore 
duty jobs require signing a contract for the revised junior critical skills retention bonus 
(RJCSRB), committing to two department head tours in exchange for a bonus that is paid 
out over multiple years. Shore duty is often the first chance that officers have to work on 
graduate education. 
d. Department Head School 
Department head school is a combination of advanced tactics training in 
Dahlgren, Virginia, and a standard course of surface warfare knowledge in Newport, 
Rhode Island. Officers assigned to different platforms (specifically, Aegis versus non-
Aegis billets) receive different lengths of review. 
e. Department Head Tours 
Officers serve two Department Head tours, eighteen months each. Certain jobs are 
reserved for second tour department heads or require a “fleet up” after another tour. 
During the department head tour, officers are responsible for standing tactical watches 
underway, while overseeing personnel, schedules, and training while in port. Typically 
there are four to seven Department Heads on a ship who act as advisors and carry out the 
commander’s guidance. 
 6 
2. Qualification and Selection 
Qualification in watchstanding positions is standardized using Personnel 
Qualification Standard, though ships often add on-the-job-training or under instruction 
time to reinforce skills and gain the commanding officer’s confidence before being fully 
qualified. 
a. Surface Warfare Officer 
In order to qualify SWO, officers must complete the prerequisite qualifications, 
including Combat Information Center Watch Officer, SWO Engineering, Anti-Terrorism 
Watch Officer, and Underway Officer of the Deck (OOD) (Commander, Naval Surface 
Forces, 2011, pp. 4-6). Limited Duty Officers and Chief Warrant Officers can have a 
slightly modified training sequence. Following qualification as SWO, an 1160 officer’s 
designation is changed to 1110.  
The timeline for 1160 officers to qualify is normally 22 months of shipboard 
service. Commanding officers have some discretion for extending the timeframe if there 
were limitations in the ship’s underway schedule or unusual circumstance (Commander, 
Naval Surface Forces, 2011, pp. 9-10). Once a Commanding Officer has endorsed the 
SWO qualification, an 1110 officer is authorized to wear the SWO insignia on the 
appropriate uniform. 
If a commanding officer finds that an unqualified junior officer “lacks motivation, 
interest, aptitude or application to qualify,” they can submit a report regarding the 
unsatisfactory progress. The report must be submitted no later than 22 months after the 
unqualified officer reports aboard, and affords the opportunity for either increased 
motivation for qualification or adjudication of non-attainment as a SWO (Commander, 
Naval Surface Forces, 2011, p. 10).  
b. Command Qualification Exam 
Between the first and second department head tour, officers take a five-part 
command qualification exam, which evaluates tactical and technical expertise. 
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Additionally, in order to qualify for exam, officers must hold an EOOW and TAO 
qualification, and receive a recommendation from their commanding officer.  
B. SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER INCENTIVES 
Monetary incentives are offered to SWOs meeting certain standards. The idea is 
that quality officers will be identified early and be obliged to remain on active duty 
because of the bonus and any service obligation they might incur.  
a. SWOCP/RJCSRB/DHRB  
Starting in October 1999, SWO continuation pay started as an incentive for SWOs 
to remain in the community through two department head tours (Chief of Naval 
Operations, 2015, p. 1). The $50,000 bonus was paid in over a period of seven years.  
NAVADMIN 012/06 further clarified Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay 
(SWOCP) bonus eligibility was based on several points (Chief of Naval Operations, 
2006): 
• Officer must be qualified and serving as a SWO (designation 111X) 
• Is selected for assignment as a department head 
• Has completed any original commissioning service commitment 
• Is able to complete two afloat department head tours (or a designated 
single longer tour) 
• Has applied for SWO continuation pay prior to graduation from 
department head school 
In October 2011, the original continuation pay and junior critical skills retention 
bonus was replaced by the revised junior critical skills retention bonus, which increase 
the amount the bonus paid but maintained the service requirement. The new incentive 
combined into a maximum of $75,000 bonus paid over six years (Chief of Naval 
Operations, 2012). The requirements for RJCSRB were similar to SWOCP except that: 
• The officer must be permanently appointed to the rank of Lieutenant 
• Be administratively screened for department head (received a department 
head recommendation on a FITREP) 
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• Have already completed division officer tours 
• Not completed/will not complete 25 years of active duty before the end of 
the contract 
• Be sea duty assignable 
In 2016, RJCSRB was adapted to allow for more stringent department head 
selection rates, and those who were selected on first or second look were eligible for 
increased bonuses, up to $105,000 (Navy Personnel Command, n.d.). In September 2016, 
this new format was codified in NAVADMIN 206/16 when the bonus was relabeled 
Department Head Retention Bonus (DHRB). The number of officers targeted to receive 
the higher bonuses were limited to 290 in each year group. Those who screened for 
department head on their first look are eligible for $105k bonus, those who screen on 
their second are eligible for $95k, and those who screen on their third are eligible for 
$75k maximum bonus (Chief of Naval Operations, 2016). 
b. Alternate Career Charts 
Starting in 2013, SWOs could select to choose the Accelerated Warfighter path, 
also known as the Weapons Tactics Instructors (WTI) Career Track, which would focus 
on Anti-Submarine Warfare and Integrated Air and Missile Defense capabilities on the 
Aegis platform aboard cruisers and destroyers (Navy Personnel Command, 2013, p. 11). 
Since then, two additional career charts have been formed, with a focus on Enhanced 
Readiness (focus on teaching and graduate education) and Accelerated Skillset 
(specialized training following the first division officer tour, with a delayed second 
division officer tour) (Navy Personnel Command, n.d., pp. 10-11).  
c. Graduate Education 
One of the Career Charts specifically targets graduate education for SWOs. As 
found on Navy Personnel Command website that identifies graduate study programs 
available to officers on active duty, there are multiple programs for which officers can 
apply (Navy Personnel Command, 2016): 
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• A tour at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), where officers’ sole duties 
are those of a graduate student 
• United States Naval Academy (USNA) LEAD Program, where officers 
serve as company officers at the Naval Academy while teaching a 
leadership class and earning a degree in Leadership 
• USNA GE+T, where students earn a graduate degree followed by a two 
year assignment at the Naval Academy 
• Graduate Education Voucher, where a maximum of $20,000 per year for 
two years can be used for graduate school tuition and fees 
• Olmstead Scholarship, where officers study at an overseas university 
• Pol-Mil Master’s Program, where officers can study in select programs 
from prestigious domestic schools  
Funded participation in any of these programs requires an additional obligation of 
service, in order for the community to recoup the talents gained through graduate 
education (Chief of Naval Operations, 2007). 
d. Career Intermission Program (CIP) 
This program, first announced in 2009, provides a one-time temporary shift from 
active duty to the individual ready reserves for one to three years. Participants can apply 
for either personal or professional reasons and maintain many benefits, including 
TRICARE coverage, a reduced stipend, and a government-funded move. Participating in 
the career intermission program (CIP) requires an additional obligated service period 
(Chief of Naval Operations, 2009). This program is available to all Navy personnel, not 
just surface warfare officers. 
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III. INTRODUCTION TO AUCTIONS AND COMBINATORIAL 
RETENTION AUCTION MECHANISM (CRAM) 
A. AUCTION BACKGROUND 
This chapter will provide an overview of auction types and methods of use to 
understand how it could be applicable and beneficial to a retention compensation system. 
To learn additional information, see Krishna (2010), Klemperer (2004), and Easley and 
Kleinberg (2010).  
The purpose behind an auction system is to determine an amount that is 
meaningful to participants by soliciting information from there (Goeree & Offerman, 
2003). As Goeree and Offerman explain, auctions can be based on either how much 
participants are willing to pay or how little they are willing to receive, and can then be 
divided further into private value auctions or common value auctions. The former has 
bidders who know their own valuation of the object but do not know how others value it, 
and the latter regards an object of known sale price but different parties have their own 
personal value for it. 
B. AUCTION TERMINOLOGY 
1. Independent Private Values 
a. Single-Unit, Private Value 
This version of bidding is a model based on the fact that each bidder is certain 
about their personal valuation of an item, different bidders independently develop their 
bids, and bidders know the distribution of values and the number of bidders (Kagel & 
Levin, p. 1). With this model, evidence shows an increase in the value of bids when the 
number of bidders increase. 
b. Single-Unit, Common Value 
In comparison, this model pertains to an item with a common value to all bidders 
(Kagel & Levin, p. 4). In this version, all parties share the signals for the value when 
competing for the item, but might have additional elements that contribute to their 
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personal valuation. In other words, the item is worth the same to all bidders, but 
participants have differing information about its true value (Goeree & Offerman, 2003, p. 
598). 
2. English versus Dutch Auction 
Auctions can proceed from either end of the price spectrum: either a low starting 
reserve price is introduced with increasing bids until participants are not willing to go 
higher and the highest bidder wins (known as English auction), or a high starting price is 
lowered until a participant chooses to accept a bid (known as Dutch auctions) (Kagel & 
Levin, p. 1).  
The English auction, also known as ascending-bid, is commonly used for selling 
goods since it leaves a single high bidder and allows all participants to know the level of 
the current high bid (McAfee & McMillan, 1987, p. 702). The Dutch auction, also known 
as descending-bid, allows the auctioneer to psychologically anchor an item’s value at a 
high price before lowering it until one bidder accepts, earning its name from the way cut 
flowers are sold in the Netherlands.  
3. Sealed-Bid 
Sealed-bid auctions are similar to English auctions, with the difference that bids 
are sealed and therefore not all participants are aware of the current bid level. Sealed-bid 
auctions can come in two forms: first-price or second-price (McAfee & McMillan, 1987, 
p. 702). First-price is very similar to English auctions because the highest bidder pays the 
high-bid they submitted; the difference comes from the lack of interaction between 
bidders because of the sealing process. Second-price auctions differ by allowing the high 
bidder to still win, but pay the second-highest bid price. 
4. Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism Background 
The distinguishing factor for Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism is the 
fact that it combines monetary and non-monetary incentives (NMI) into a single bid, then 
retains only the lowest cost bids. For example, individuals in a group are each asked their 
minimum bonus amount and a set of NMIs they desire; CRAM is then used in 
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conjunction with the desired number of people to retain to calculate the cost of the first-
excluded employee, and all selected individuals are compensated to that level, in a 
variation of a second-price auction, eliminating the desire to under- or over-bid during the 
process (Coughlan, Gates, & Myung, 2014). To learn more about CRAM methods, see 
the workings of Coughlan et al. (2014). 
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IV. SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER RETENTION SURVEY AND 
HISTORICAL QUALITY INFORMATION 
A. BACKGROUND 
A survey was conducted of surface warfare officers from Naval Postgraduate 
School and Surface Warfare Officer School (SWOS) to determine what factors 
contributed most to retention incentives, and how much individuals valued available non-
monetary incentives. The survey data included demographic and professional information 
to conceivably sort participants into “high-quality” and “other” groups in order to 
determine whether certain incentives were more attractive to “high-quality” SWOs. 
B. SURVEY DISTRIBUTION 
The survey was developed and distributed via LimeSurvey, an NPS approved 
survey tool. Questions in the survey were highly based on Kelso’s 2014 work with naval 
aviators and tried to determine participants’ 1) personal bid for remaining a SWO through 
two department head tours, 2) personal value of NMIs currently available, and 3) quality 
via career achievements and qualifications (Kelso, 2014). 
After submission to and approval by the NPS Institutional Review Board (IRB), 
we sent an email to NPS resident SWOs, identified by the SWO chair on campus. The 
survey was open from September 26, 2016, until October 10, 2016. A reminder was send 
to those students who had not completed the survey on October 3, 2016. Because 
individual student emails were provided by the SWO chair, participants received an 
individualized web token to ensure that each student only completed the survey once. 
To reach SWOS students, a recruitment email was distributed to the instructors at 
SWOS, who then gave the website link to their students. Because of the overlapping 
timing of multiple classes at the SWOS command, the SWOS survey was open from 
September 16, 2016, through October 10, 2016. A reminder recruitment letter was sent to 
instructors on September 29, 2016. Instructors were aware the survey was voluntary and 
did not exert undue influence for student participation, but provided the website link and 
contact information to ensure students could contact researchers with any questions. 
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C. SAMPLE STATISTICS 
The potential sample population included 101 officers at NPS and approximately 
300 students at SWOS, distributed amongst multiple locations. 105 officers initiated 
survey responses, though five did not complete the consent section and 13 more failed to 
complete a significant portion of the survey after consenting, yielding 87 responses with 
enough information from which to derive some analysis.  
Table 1 summarizes the sample population demographics, including the 
breakdown of officers’ ship platform for first division officer tour. 
 Survey Demographics Table 1.  
 Number of Records 
Percent of 
population 
CG 18 20.7% 
DDG 31 35.6% 
FFG 7 8.0% 
MCM 14 16.1% 
LHD 4 4.6% 
LHA 1 1.1% 
LSD 11 12.6% 
LCC 1 1.1% 
NPS 37 42.5% 
SWOS 50 57.5% 
O-1 + (O-1E) 45 (2) 54.0% 
O-2 6 6.9% 
O-3 + (O-3E) 31 (3) 39.1% 
Male 64 73.6% 
Female 22 25.3% 
  No Gender 1 1.1% 
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D. BIDDING PROCESS 
1. Uniform-Price Auction Bids 
The first requirement for determining auction potential for retaining quality 
officers is determining bids for individual reservation values. Adapting the auction 
system explanation that Eric Kelso used in his thesis work with naval aviators, we asked 
the question, 
The following scenario is a hypothetic situation. Suppose the Navy 
replaces the current DHRB program with one that uses an auction-based 
system to determine the bonus amount for a specified number of contracts. 
This auction-based format would work in the follow manner: Suppose 
there are 100 SWOs eligible to receive retention bonuses and the Navy 
announces it will seek to retain 60 of those SWOs. Each SWO would 
individually and privately submit a bid with the minimum bonus amount 
he or she would be willing to accept in exchange for agreeing to complete 
two “Department Head Tours.” The Navy would compile all the bids and 
award the bonuses to the 60 SWOs with the lowest bids, but it would pay 
each of them the amount listed in the 61st lowest bid (e.g., if the 61st 
lowest bid was $75,000 then the 60 winning SWOs would each receive 
$75,000 even though each had offered to accept a lower amount). The 
remaining SWOs would not receive bonuses and would not be obligated to 
serve a “Department Head Tour.” This auction format is designed to be in 
a bidder’s best interest to bid truthfully. That is, there is no incentive to 
“game” the system by overbidding or underbidding. Assume you are in a 
group of 200 SWOs eligible to receive a retention bonus. If, under the 
system described above, the Navy’s goal is to retain 70 SWOs, what is the 
amount you would likely submit for your bid (total bonus amount, 
replacing the current DHRB system)? (Kelso, 2014) 
Respondents were then able to choose from radio buttons that ranged from $0 to 
$175,000 in $5,000 increments, plus the choices “Do not wish to be retained” and 
“Greater than $175,000.” Immediately following was this question to determine 
respondents’ understanding of the auction: “How well do you feel you understand the 
auction-based system described above (e.g., who is retained, how bonus amount is 
determined, how you should bid).” Tables 2 and 3 summarize the responses to these two 
questions. 
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Bid Mode Std Dev 
O-1 47 6 6 3 32 $115,313 $110,000 $150,000 $39,761 
O-2 6 - 1 - 5 $77,000 $80,000 $100,000 $28,636 
O-3 34 1 4 1 28 $83,750 $95,000 $100,000 $41,803 












O-1 5 2 8 17 15 
O-2  - - - 3 3 
O-3 -  2 8 9 15 
 
2. Quality Adjusted Discount (QUAD) Scores 
As previously explained, the surface community currently using quantitative and 
qualitative factors to determine officer rankings and thus, quality. Qualitative properties 
are converted into additional “points” to be added to a qualitative score. This survey did 
not ask for FITREP (i.e., quantitative) information due to the lack of service time for 
some junior officers, but focused instead on the qualitative factors. Quantitative 
information for consideration was obtained separately using historical data provided by 
PERS-41 and retention data. We used the following qualitative categories on survey 
respondents: 
• SWO pin 
• Department head recommendation by end of first tour 
• Advanced qualifications earned by the end of second division officer tour 
• Chosen for any additional selective billets or qualifications 
Because this survey focused on junior officers, some respondents had not yet been 
on sea duty long enough to earn any of the above qualifications. Forty-one respondents 
indicated they had earned a SWO pin, and that group became the sample for quality. 
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Table 4 illustrates the three categories for which individuals could be assigned 
quality point values. Of note, for both “Qualifications Earned on Sea Duty” and 
“Selective Billets,” multiple categories might be met, but only the highest earned point 
value was applied to the individual’s score. Each individual received a score from each of 
the three categories that was then summed, resulting in a possible low score of zero and a 
possible high score of eight. 
 Quality Point Values Table 4.  
First Division Officer 
Performance Points 




Qualification Earned by 
Second Division Officer 
Tour 
Points 
TAO (Aegis) 4 





Selective Billets Points 
WTI 3 




3. CRAM Bids 
As previously discussed, CRAM deals with how an individual values an NMI. For 
this survey, we asked participants about how they value preferred duty station for 
department head tour and the alternate career charts, of which three are available. 
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a. DH Guaranteed Duty Station 
Survey participants were asked two questions in relation to duty station: preferred 
location for DH tour and how much money from a cash bonus they would be willing to 
forgo to be guaranteed that location. The choices for location were  1) Do not wish to 
serve as SWO DH, 2) Continental United States (CONUS) East Coast, 3) CONUS West 
Coast, 4) Japan, 5) Rota, 6) Hawaii, and 7) Other. Bonus amounts to forgo were entered 
as numerical values by the participant with no suggested values provided. 
Of the 87 respondents, 13 declined to answer or indicated they did not wish to 
serve a DH tour and five did not include monetary amounts, leaving 69 responses from 
which to collect NMI data. Tables 5 and 6 summarize this data by paygrade and location, 
respectively. Mean, median, and standard deviation value only take into account those 
bids greater than $0. 










Value Std Dev 
O-1 34 27 79.4% $57,055 $50,000 $51,815 
O-2 5 4 80.0% $16,250 $15,000 $11,086 
O-3 30 19 63.3% $34,368 $10,000 $44,084 
 NMI Value of DH Tour Location by Location Table 6.  









Value Std Dev 
CONUS East Coast 11 5 45.5% $40,000 $25,000 $39,843 
CONUS West Coast 34 28 82.4% $48,304 $25,000 $49,289 
Hawaii 4 3 75.0% $6,667 $5,000 $2,887 
Japan 8 7 87.5% $58,714 $50,000 $58,906 
Other 2 2 100.0% $70,000 $70,000 $77,782 
Rota 10 5 50.0% $27,000 $10,000 $40,866 
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b. Guaranteed Alternate Career Chart 
Participants were asked to value the guarantee of being assigned each of the 
alternate career charts. Each of these career charts was described: 
• Accelerated Warfighter (Warfare Tactics Instructor) 
• Enhanced Readiness (First Shore duty, or specialized training/ 
teaching/NPS/civilian graduate education) 
• Accelerated Skillset Building (delay 2nd sea duty to allow advanced 
skillset development at O-2 time) 
Participants were told that hypothetically, “However, if you choose one of these 
options, you would be asked to give up a portion of your bonus. Consider each option 
individually. How much of the "SWO Bonus" would you be willing to give up to be 
guaranteed the ______ Career Chart?” 
Out of 87 participants who completed the survey, 14 failed to provide information 
for this section or entered nonsensical answers (i.e., “$1, $1, $1” or “$12345” in every 
fill-in-the-blank box), leaving 73 participants from which to derive statistical analysis. 
Tables 7 and 8 display the monetary amount of their bonus each participant would be 
willing to forgo in order to participate in each alternate career chart, considered 
individually. Table 7 shows the results by paygrade and Table 8 shows the results by 
alternate career chart. 
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 NMI Value of Alternate Career Charts by Paygrade Table 7.  
Accelerated Warfighter 










Value Std Dev 
O-1 35 15 42.9% $42,400 $20,000 $48,373 
O-2 6 1 16.7% $10,000 $10,000 - 
O-3 31 8 25.8% $19,750 $10,000 $34,566 












Value Std Dev 
O-1 35 19 54.3% $41,105 $25,000 $40,584 
O-2 6 2 33.3% $22,500 $22,500 $3,536 
O-3 31 11 35.5% $16,409 $10,000 $13,742 












Value Std Dev 
O-1 35 19 54.3% $38,526 $25,000 $45,124 
O-2 6 3 50.0% $16,667 $20,000 $5,774 
O-3 31 5 16.1% $10,000 $10,000 $6,124 












Value Std Dev 
Accelerated 
Warfighter 72 24 33.3% $33,500 $10,000 $43,925 
Enhanced 
Readiness 72 32 44.4% $31,453 $20,000 $34,063 
Accelerated 
Skillset 72 27 37.5% $30,815 $15,000 $39,596 
 
E. HISTORICAL QUALITY INFORMATION 
To determine whether the Navy could gain cost savings by implementing a 
quality-based auction system, we had to analyze historical information regarding which 
SWOs are retained and who takes bonuses. PERS-41, the office that details SWOs to 
assignments, provided historical information for certain year groups regarding 
demographics, FITREP data, and who received a bonus. Because of the limitations with 
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historical data, the same parameters that were used to determine survey participants’ 
quality were not available (i.e., top qualification earned by the end of second division 
officer tour, flag aide or WTI participation, or DH recommendation during first division 
officer tour). Therefore, the quantitative FITREP measure was the most accessible 
parameter to use. 
We received a separate record for each FITREP an individual received, meaning 
that some individuals received three or four records in a single year (for example, a 
lieutenant junior grade received a periodic FITREP in February, and change of reporting 
senior FITREP in July, and a detaching FITREP in December). To distill a single record 
for each individual for each year, we calculated in Excel the length of time of the 
FITREP (using the begin and end date), then calculated which of multiple FITREPs in a 
single year covered the greatest amount of time.  
At this point the data was reduced to a single annual record for each individual, 
but each year was a separate record. We reshaped the information so that social security 
numbers acted as a record identifier with each annual year of information becoming a 
separate column, reducing the records to a single row for each individual. This yielded 
5,413 records. 
One more limitation of our data is the fact that FITREP data is not retained for 
officers who separate from the military. Therefore, quality data had to be extrapolated for 
the missing years. The most complete year group information we could extract was from 
year group 11, for whom we had ensign, lieutenant junior grade, and lieutenant FITREPs. 
We also assumed that for year group 11, a minimal number of SWOs had reached their 
service obligation and left the military, therefore leaving a larger representative group of 
FITREPs to use for data. 
Variations in the number of records for each year could result from non-observed 
FITREPs or a lapse in annual FITREP due to transfer timing. To see whether there was a 
strong correlation between reporting senior cumulative average and an individual’s trait 
average, we ran a correlation and included the results. Table 9 contains the data for year 
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group 2011 FITREP statistics in the first five years of service to be used as a comparison 
standard for quality retention against other year groups. 
 FITREP Statistical Basis for Year Group 2011 Table 9.  









Std Dev Corr R-Sqr Int Int P-value Coeff 
Coeff 
P-Value 
ENS 2012 563 3.808 3.830 0.3808 0.6045 0.3654 0.1819 0.3687 0.9455 2.25E-57 
ENS 2013 348 3.962 4.000 0.4089 0.4765 0.2270 0.6153 4.73E-11 1.5986 4E-21 
LTJG 2014 445 4.036 4.000 0.3943 0.5896 0.3476 0.2444 0.3238 0.9440 5.23E-43 
LTJG 2015 390 4.103 4.140 0.3764 0.5585 0.3120 0.2041 0.4886 0.9664 2.26E-33 
LT 2016 453 4.033 4.000 0.4222 0.3335 0.3120 2.9416 1.49E-64 0.2631 3.14E-13 
 
A strong correlation does not occur between reporting senior cumulative average 
and an individual’s trait average, meaning that variation in the individual’s trait average 
is not largely due to how their reporting senior grades junior officers. 
Once we had a basis for what representative FITREP scores would be for the 
group as a whole at each of the first five years of their career, we could compare that 
value to other year groups and determine whether the missing data from departing 
officers indicated the loss of high-quality or low-quality officers, as seen in Table 10. 
These YG11 values became the expected value for statistical significance. Other 
individual year groups became the observed values, with a null hypothesis that observed 
values would be equal to expected values, with the significance set to 95% when 
determining the critical t-value. 
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 FITREP Data for Individual Year Groups (YG) Table 10.  




YG 2006 Standard YG Statistical Significance 
Obs Avg Trait Avg 
Med 




Avg Std Dev T-value P-value Stat Sig? 
ENS 2007 266 3.9050 4.0000 0.4303 3.8080 3.8300 0.3808 3.2762 0.0011 Yes 
ENS 2008 163 4.0930 4.1400 0.4238 3.9620 4.0000 0.4089 3.3285 0.0009 Yes 
LTJG 2009 231 4.2190 4.2900 0.3376 4.0360 4.0000 0.3943 5.9931 0.0001 Yes 
LTJG 2010 175 4.2740 4.2900 0.3776 4.1030 4.1400 0.3764 4.9999 0.0001 Yes 
LT 2011 189 4.2690 4.3300 0.4129 4.0330 4.0000 0.4222 6.5098 0.0001 Yes 
 
YG 2007 Standard YG Statistical Significance 
Obs Avg Trait Avg 
Med 




Avg Std Dev T-value P-value Stat Sig? 
ENS 2008 243 3.8980 4.0000 0.4081 3.8080 3.8300 0.3808 3.0175 0.0026 Yes 
ENS 2009 155 4.0420 4.1400 0.3607 3.9620 4.0000 0.4089 2.0938 0.0368 Yes 
LTJG 2010 208 4.1760 4.1700 0.3194 4.0360 4.0000 0.3943 4.4855 0.0001 Yes 
LTJG 2011 177 4.2300 4.2900 0.3428 4.1030 4.1400 0.3764 3.8277 0.0001 Yes 
LT 2012 171 4.2810 4.2900 0.3898 4.0330 4.0000 0.4222 6.6839 0.0001 Yes 
 
YG 2008 Standard YG Statistical Significance 
Obs Avg Trait Avg 
Med 




Avg Std Dev T-value P-value Stat Sig? 
ENS 2009 312 3.8160 3.8300 0.4307 3.8080 3.8300 0.3808 0.2943 0.7686 No 
ENS 2010 194 3.9750 4.0000 0.3467 3.9620 4.0000 0.4089 0.3741 0.7085 No 
LTJG 2011 254 4.1180 4.1400 0.3719 4.0360 4.0000 0.3943 2.6988 0.0071 Yes 
LTJG 2012 219 4.2060 4.2900 0.3814 4.1030 4.1400 0.3764 3.2105 0.0014 Yes 
LT 2013 245 4.1950 4.2900 0.4220 4.0330 4.0000 0.4222 4.8363 0.0001 Yes 
 
YG 2009 Standard YG Statistical Significance 
Obs Avg Trait Avg 
Med 




Avg Std Dev T-value P-value Stat Sig? 
ENS 2010 366 3.7910 3.8300 0.3808 3.8080 3.8300 0.3808 0.6805 0.4964 No 
ENS 2011 241 4.0160 4.0000 0.4070 3.9620 4.0000 0.4089 1.5794 0.1148 No 
LTJG 2012 296 4.0590 4.1400 0.4277 4.0360 4.0000 0.3943 0.7645 0.4448 No 
LTJG 2013 267 4.1500 4.1400 0.3698 4.1030 4.1400 0.3764 1.5744 0.1159 No 
LT 2014 305 4.1620 4.1700 0.3754 4.0330 4.0000 0.4222 4.3268 0.0001 Yes 
 
YG 2010 Standard YG Statistical Significance 
Obs Avg Trait Avg 
Med 




Avg Std Dev T-value P-value Stat Sig? 
ENS 2011 522 3.7670 3.8300 0.3938 3.8080 3.8300 0.3808 1.7329 0.0834 No 
ENS 2012 358 3.9910 4.0000 0.4250 3.9620 4.0000 0.4089 0.9112 0.3625 No 
LTJG 2013 397 4.0530 4.1400 0.3788 4.0360 4.0000 0.3943 0.6333 0.5267 No 
LTJG 2014 378 4.1300 4.1400 0.3701 4.1030 4.1400 0.3764 1.0148 0.3105 No 
LT 2015 436 4.1010 4.1400 0.3779 4.0330 4.0000 0.4222 2.5207 0.0119 Yes 
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Based on these results, there was a mixed result as to whether the officers retained 
in previous year groups had statistically significant higher FITREP scores when 
compared to the standard group. That is, neither particularly high quality nor low quality 
officers were retained and remained on active duty as SWOs compared to the standard 
year group, though every YG had a statistically significantly higher LT FITREP than the 
standard group. Therefore, the legacy bonus system retained officers marginally 
comparable to the standard quality, but did not particularly retain significantly high 
quality officers; however, perhaps a bonus system that focused on quality points other 
than FITREP average could increase the quality of officers retained to serve as 
department heads. 
F. OTHER BONUS FACTORS 
From other questions in the survey, participants indicated NMI and bonus 
schedules that would change their opinion of the bonus. 
1. Other NMI Requested 
Participants indicated a variety of NMI would affect their reservation bid or desire 
to stay in the Navy, including: 
• Guaranteed DH billet 
• Guaranteed DH ship platform 
• Guaranteed DH location for both tours 
• Guarantee of early command 
• Career Intermission Program / nonconsecutive DH tours 
2. Continuation Pay 
The new Blended Retirement System will implement a continuation pay bonus. 
To determine the effect this has on individuals taking bonuses, we asked the following 
question: 
The Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission 
(MCRMC) made recommendations for the military retirement system that 
will be implemented in 2018. One cash payout portion of the report 
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includes a continuation pay that will be dispersed at Year of Service 
(YOS) 12. This bonus will equal 2.5 times monthly basic pay, plus a 
potential additional pay to be provided by service, with an associated 
obligation to remain on active duty for four more years. 
At YOS 12, you expect to be an O-4. In 2016 dollars, you expect a 
monthly base pay of $7,081.50, meaning the minimum continuation pay 
amount would be $17,703.75. 
Assuming your continuation pay offered at the 12 year mark is $18,000, 
how likely would you be to accept the bonus in exchange for a 4 year 
commitment? 
Though we did not ask respondents if they had prior knowledge of the system, 
this question was designed to provide a thorough explanation for individuals to 
understand their possible actions. Respondent answers were: 
• Very Unlikely – 6 (7.7%) 
• Unlikely – 8 (10.4%) 
• Somewhat Unlikely – 9 (11.7%) 
• Neutral / Uncertain – 18 (23.4%) 
• Somewhat Likely – 15 (19.5%) 
• Likely – 14 (18.2%) 
• Very Likely – 7 (9.1%) 
While only some of the participants will be eligible for continuation pay (one 
must opt for the Blended Retirement System), this normal curve of responses indicates 
another opportunity for the SWO community to incentivize individuals to stay for DH 
tours. 
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V. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The data was analyzed in two parts: survey results were subjected to a simulated 
auction scenario, followed by historical data analysis to see if an auction bonus system 
would provide the government with cost savings. 
The auction system will be displayed in four models: first, a simple auction using 
only SWO retention goals; second, applying a simulated quality point scale for a QUAD 
auction; third and fourth, simulating CRAM with NMIs of DH tour location and alternate 
career charts, respectively. The total costs of each of these systems will then be compared 
to the current system to determine whether the government could save costs by switching 
systems. To determine the population, we will assume that bids can be made at any point 
in a SWO’s career, though the more junior the officer the less chance they have had to 
develop quality points, which might affect their position in the quality bonus rating. 
Therefore, all participants who included a hypothetical bid and enough information in the 
NMI section will be considered part of the population. 
B. GENERAL ANALYSIS 
To simulate a standard auction bonus system, we will use the SWO retention goal 
announced in 2015 at 50-60%; we will use the 60% mark as it is closer to the historical 
80% bonus allotment (Navy Personnel Command, n.d., p. 13). In this case, with 67 
survey participants meeting the requirements and answering enough survey information 
for statistical use, the retention goal will be to retain 40 SWOs. 
C. SIMPLE UNIFORM PRICE AUCTION 
1. Auction Standard 
In the reverse of a normal auction system, where the highest bidder wins, this 
form of auction allows the lowest bids to win (thus giving the government the greatest 
cost savings). To determine this, all the bids are sorted in ascending order and the lowest 
40 bids are the SWOs who are retained. In case the cut-off point occurs between two bids 
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of equal value, the person with the higher quality points is the one retained. As explained 
in the survey during the bid process, over- or underbidding is discouraged by setting the 
bonus at the first excluded bid price.  
2. Results 
The simple uniform price auction resulted in a cut-off point of $110,000, which 
four participants bid; three were to be accepted and one was to be excluded. However, by 
applying the quality point differentiator for a new cut-off, one participant had six points 
and three participants had zero. In this case, the cut-off was raised to include one 
additional participant and cut-off between $110,000 and $115,000. As the first excluded 
bid, $115,000 became the bonus amount for all the participants whose bids were 
accepted. 
D. QUAD AUCTION MODEL 
1. QUAD Standard 
In this model, a discount was applied to the bids of the ten participants who 
scored in the top 15% of the sample. We set the amount of the discount at $30,000, based 
on the recent increase of the bonus from $75,000 under RJCSRB to $105,000 under 
DHRB. The simple auction format was then carried out with the ten bids discounted. 
2. Results 
The QUAD auction resulted in a cut-off point of $110,000. Though one of the 
original $110,000 bids was discounted to $80,000, an identical cut-off dilemma to the 
simple uniform price auction resulted. Again, the first excluded bid of $115,000 became 
the bonus amount for all the accepted participants. The overall average quality points for 
these participants was 1.403, with the individual score range between 0 and 6. All ensigns 
received quality scores of 0, having met none of the score requirements, while lieutenants 
junior grade scores ranged from 1 to 4, and lieutenants from 1 to 6. 
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E. CRAM MODEL I 
1. CRAM Standard for NMI: Guaranteed Location 
The estimated cost of a permanent change of station (PCS) is $15,000 (Secretary 
of the Navy, 2014). To account for this, participants’ reservation bids were decreased by 
$15,000 and then applied as an adjustment price to their initial bonus bid (if the amount 
resulted in a negative cost, a zero was entered for their adjusted bid). As before, if the 
retention cut-off point occurred in a group with the same bid, quality points were 
examined as a differentiator. 
2. Results 
The CRAM model for guaranteed duty station resulted in a cut-off point of 
$100,000. Five participants bid this amount and only one was to be retained; when 
examining quality points, two participants tied and were both retained. The first excluded 
bid was $105,000, so all 41 retained participants were granted this amount. 
F. CRAM MODEL II 
1. CRAM Standard for NMI: Alternate Career Chart 
While there is presumably an associated cost for each alternate career chart, the 
variation in locations and newness of the program makes it difficult to estimate. For 
simplicity and standardization, we assume the Accelerated Warfighter will be the most 
expensive program because it definitely includes a move and schooling, Enhanced 
Readiness will be the second most expensive because it might require a move or 
schooling, and Accelerated Skillset will be the least expensive because it simply 
rearranges the legacy career milestones. For that reason, Accelerated Warfighter bids will 
be reduced by $10,000, Enhanced Readiness bids will be reduced by $8,000, and 
Accelerated Skillset bids will not be reduced. 
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a. Accelerated Warfighter Standard 
By reducing any NMI bid over $10,000 for the desired chart by that amount, and 
then applying the revised amount to the bonus amount, those who valued the career chart 
higher were now closer to the top for retention. 
b. Accelerated Warfighter Results 
The CRAM model for guaranteed NMI of Accelerated Warfighter resulted in a 
cut-off point of $105,000. Three participants bid this amount and though two should have 
been excluded by retention goals, all three had the same quality points and thus all three 
were retained, resulting in a retention allowance of 42 individuals. The first excluded bid 
was $110,000, so all 42 retained participants were granted this amount. 
c. Enhanced Readiness Standard 
By reducing any NMI bid over $8,000 for the desired chart by that amount, and 
then applying the revised amount to the bonus amount, those who valued the career chart 
higher were now closer to the top for retention. 
d. Enhanced Readiness Results 
The CRAM model for Enhanced Readiness resulted in a cut-off point of 
$100,000. Nine participants bid this amount, but only seven were to be retained, which 
matched with a natural cut-off in quality points; 40 participants were retained. The first 
excluded bid was $108,000, so all 40 retained participants were granted this amount. 
e. Accelerated Skillset Standard 
This NMI bid was not reduced, and was simply deducted from the individual’s 
reservation bid.  
f. Accelerated Skillset Results 
The CRAM model for Accelerated Skillset had a cut-off point of $100,000. 
Thirteen participants had adjusted bids of that amount and ten were to be retained; we 
evaluated quality points and while nine had quality points that clearly included them in 
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the bonus group, there was no distinction for the other four. Therefore, all 13 participants 
at this bid level were retained with a $100,000 bid, leaving the number retained at 43 
participants. The first excluded bid was $109,000, so all 43 SWOs retained would receive 
this amount. 
2. Overall CRAM Results 
Several observations about this CRAM method help determine whether it would 
be a usable format for a bonus auction. First, even if the retention rate was reduced to 
50%, the cut-off point occurred within the same block of bidders and did not change the 
first excluded bid amount; the only change for payouts might be the number of quality 
participants and therefore the number of payouts made, but not the amount of each 
payout.  
Second, the overall bids from ensigns was higher to start than the bids from 
lieutenants. This could possibly be a factor of the shift from RJCSRB of $75,000 that 
most lieutenants were offered to DHRB of $105,000 that most ensigns expect to be 
offered; being mentally anchored at a higher amount count contribute to the marked 
difference between how ranks bid, and skew the results to a higher amount.  
Third, though participants overall indicated they understood the auction system, 
some participants bid a low amount and then indicated they were willing to forgo a 
higher amount to receive an NMI. These bids were entered as zeroes, but in an actual 
bidding situation they would have to bid a higher amount or lower their NMI amount.  
Fourth, the highest quality participants were naturally more senior and have had 
more time to gain qualifications. However, because of the aforementioned anchoring, 
these participants already had relatively low bids, so they were already in the retention 
group. The quality portion of this auction would have been more significant if either 
more people received the bid discount due to quality or if the retention target was lower. 
Because of this, we examined the QUAD data for just lieutenants to see if there is a 
significance in quality score and bid distribution.  
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G. QUAD AUCTION MODEL—LIEUTENANTS ONLY 
1. QUAD Standard 
Thirty lieutenants included enough data to be included in this specific QUAD 
analysis. Quality discounts in the amount of $30,000 should be applied to the top 15% (5 
individuals), but the quality point cut-off was better suited to allowing six individuals to 
receive discounts, resulting in the top 20% receiving discounts. The discount remained at 
$30,000. The simple auction format was then carried out with the six bids discounted and 
retention goals remaining at 60%. 
2. Results 
This QUAD auction resulted in a cut-off point of $100,000. Seven participants bid 
this amount and three of those individuals were desired for retention, but quality points 
increased retention to six of these bidders, with one bidder being excluded and 21 
individuals receiving the first excluded bid of $125,000. The average quality score for 
lieutenant-only QUAD was 2.833, with individuals receiving a range from 1 to 6 quality 
points.  
H. COST SAVINGS 
According to PERS-311 records, 57 SWOs took SWOCP money and 1,485 took 
RJCSRB for year groups 2006 to 2011. Because these bonuses were limited to $75,000, 
the total payment for these bonuses was $115,650,000. Using year group 2011 as a basis 
for calculation, 148 SWOs took the bonus for a total cost of $11,100,000. Because year 
group 2011 was targeted for 80% retention, we can calculate that the entire year group 
was comprised of 185 SWOs. Table 11 summarizes the actual amounts paid to year 
group 2011 under the RJCSRB system with 80% retention, the projected amounts that 
would be paid if year group 2011 were under the DHRB system with 60% retention, and 
the total payouts for each of the models being applied to the year group. 
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 Cost Savings of Various Bonus Systems Pegged to RJCSRB Table 11.  
Year Group 2011 










RJCSRB 80% $75,000 $11,100,000 - - 
DHRB 
50% $105,000 $9,712,500 $1,387,500  12.5% 
60% $105,000 $11,655,000 $(555,000) -5.0% 
Simple Auction 
50% $105,000 $9,712,500 $1,387,500 12.5% 
60% $115,000 $12,765,000 $(1,665,000) -15.0% 
QUAD 
50% $105,000 $9,712,500 $1,387,500 12.5% 
60% $115,000 $12,765,000 $(1,665,000) -15.0% 
CRAM: Duty Location 
50% $100,000 $9,250,000 $1,850,000 16.7% 
60% $105,000 $11,655,000 $(555,000) -5.0% 
CRAM: Accelerated Warfighter 
50% $105,000 $9,712,500 $1,387,500 12.5% 
60% $110,000 $12,210,000 $(1,110,000) -10.0% 
CRAM: Enhanced Readiness 
50% $108,000 $9,990,000 $1,110,000 10.0% 
60% $108,000 $11,988,000 $(888,000) -8.0% 
CRAM: Accelerated Skillset 
50% $109,000 $10,082,500 $1,017,500 9.2% 
60% $109,000 $12,099,000 $(999,000) -9.0% 
 
Though the individual bonus for each model is sometimes the same between the 
50% and 60% retention target, the lower number of payouts required for the 50% payout 
can result in a cost savings for some models. At a 60% retention target, none of the 
models provide a cost savings. However, these values are pegged to RJCSRB and 
historical numbers. Table 12 pegs the values to DHRB at 55% retention. 
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 Cost Savings of Various Bonus Systems Pegged to DHRB Table 12.  
Year Group 2011 










DHRB 55% $105,000 $10,683,750 - - 
Simple Auction 
50% $105,000 $9,712,500 $971,250 9.1% 
60% $115,000 $12,765,000 $(2,081,250) -19.5% 
QUAD 
50% $105,000 $9,712,500 $971,250 9.1% 
60% $115,000 $12,765,000 $(2,081,250) -19.5% 
CRAM: Duty Location 
50% $100,000 $9,250,000 $1,433,750 13.4% 
60% $105,000 $11,655,000 $(971,250) -9.1% 
CRAM: Accelerated Warfighter 
50% $105,000 $9,712,500 $971,250 9.1% 
60% $110,000 $12,210,000 $(1,526,250) -14.3% 
CRAM: Enhanced Readiness 
50% $108,000 $9,990,000 $693,750 6.5% 
60% $108,000 $11,988,000 $(1,304,250) -12.2% 
CRAM: Accelerated Skillset 
50% $109,000 $10,082,500 $601,250 5.6% 
60% $109,000 $12,099,000 $(1,415,250) -13.2% 
 
Even pegged to DHRB with a retention target of 55% (the average retention goal), 
none of the models show a cost savings potential at 60% retention, but all show a savings 
at 50% retention.  
Based on the historical data used and the survey results, none of the models will 
result in a cost savings to the Navy when considering auction systems to determine bonus 
amounts. However, because this data was collected from a variety of paygrades, with a 
large range of quality scores, and from participants who possibly had varied anchored 




VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
We planned to model the potential cost savings that might result from modifying 
the former RJCSRB bonus and current DHRB bonus into an auction-based system for 
surface warfare officers obligating to two department head tours, with the additional 
consideration of quality points and NMIs. These potential replacement bonus systems 
were applied to a simple auction system, a QUAD system, and two CRAM systems. 
Surveying SWO students at SWOS and NPS, we received 67 usable bids that could be 
used to identify quality officers. Reservation prices were then determined for each of the 
models (applying discounts as appropriate) and simulated using published retention 
goals. The costs of these simulated models were then compared to historical costs of 
surface warfare officer bonus programs.  
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The results of these simulations showed limited potential for cost savings by using 
auction systems for future bonus systems. The only time cost savings were realized was 
with minimal retention goals. 
Our auction format had limitations that might misrepresent the potential 
usefulness of these system. Targeting three ranks with a wide level of experience led to 
differences in bids that were tied to rank. The experiences that more senior officers had 
anchored expectations in a different way than those of more junior officers. Also, the 
quality portion of the bonuses had a lower effect than expected because it did not 
drastically change the range of people or amount of bonus received. If more people were 
awarded quality concessions or retention targets were lower, the application of quality 
points would have had a larger effect. 
Because community retention goals were released as a flexible range, we were 
able to calculate cost savings for both extremes of the range. If retention was decreased to 
the minimum of 50%, overall cost savings using any of these systems would be an 
average of $1,063,750 compared to estimated DHRB payouts. However, if the 
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community uses the retention goal of 60%, overall costs compared to DHRB would 
increase by an average $1,470,750. However, the DHRB system is set up to have follow-
on reduced retention goals in subsequent years for those who do not meet initial 
requirements. Therefore, any small potential cost savings could be negated by the follow-
on bonuses distributed in smaller amounts to a small number of people. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This data could be refined if a follow-on study used a larger number of 
participants of junior officers. Because a number of the more senior participants had 
already obligated to a legacy bonus system (and therefore anchored expectations to the 
legacy amount), a survey that used just a large group of junior officers who had not taken 
the bonus might be more representative of cost-savings potential. 
Additionally, because we attempted to use historical data that was not specifically 
correlated to survey demographics (i.e., we did not attempt to match FITREP data to our 
survey participants) we had to make assumptions for the quality retention portion. If a 
future survey collected specific, reliable FITREP data from participants, those researchers 
could better determine the quality of officers who have already accepted bonus contracts. 
Lastly, though this thesis focused on monetary bonuses (or value of non-monetary 
incentives), many survey participants felt strongly that money should not be used as the 
sole incentive offered by the military. They raised concerns that applying a quality point 
system would create competitive incentives amongst peers, and quality on paper might 
not be the same thing as quality performance. Future researchers should continue to adapt 
measurement systems in an attempt to better measure an officer’s potential in a 
meaningful way. 
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APPENDIX.  COPY OF SURVEY 
Survey of SWO Retention (SWOS) 
This research survey will help aggregate data for use in a master's thesis. 
There are 55 questions in this survey 
1. Preview 
The opinions you express in the following survey will give researchers an idea of 
what incentives motivate Surface Warfare Officers to stay in the Navy. 
  
The first question will serve as your consent (since signatures cannot be collected 
with this online survey), and will followed by questions regarding your opinions 
and demographics. 
  
This survey is expected to take approximately 20 minutes to complete. 
  
Thank you in advance for your response! 
Please choose all that apply: 
•  I understand! 
2. Informed Consent 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Consent to Participate in Research 
If you wish to retain a copy of this statement for your personal records, please 
print this screen. 
  
Introduction.  You are invited to participate in a research study entitled Survey 
of SWO Retention (2016).  The purpose of the research is solicit opinions on the 
timing of multiple bonuses during the standard Navy career and how bonus timing 
effects retention. 
  
Procedures.  This survey will ask you to make a series of economic and financial 
decisions. The decisions will be made through your computer station. This survey 
will take about 15-25 minutes. About 250 subjects are expected to participate in 
this experiment. The procedures are only related to the research and serve no 
purpose other than this research endeavor. The details of the experiment will be 
provided in the instruction section. 
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Location. The survey will take place online, following the completion of this 
consent form. 
  
Voluntary Nature of the Study.  Your participation in this study is strictly 
voluntary.  If you choose to participate you can change your mind at any time and 
withdraw from the study. You will not be penalized in any way or lose any 
benefits to which you would otherwise be entitled if you choose not to participate 
in this study or to withdraw. Alternative to participating in the study is to not 
participate. 
  
Potential Risks and Discomforts. The potential risks of participating in this 
study are minimal. As with any experiment, there is a possibility of breach of 
confidentiality. Please see confidentiality and privacy statement below. This 
project does not involve greater than minimal risk and involve no known 
reasonably foreseeable risks or hazards greater than those encountered in 
everyday life. 
  
Anticipated Benefits.  Results from this survey could advance economic science 
and develop more efficient and effective means of bonus timing and amounts to 
meet required retention levels. You will not directly benefit from your 
participation in this research.   
  
Confidentiality & Privacy Act.  Any information that is obtained during this 
study will be kept confidential to the full extent permitted by law. All efforts, 
within reason, will be made to keep your personal information in your research 
record confidential but total confidentiality cannot be guaranteed.  Your name will 
not be l inked to any publications and a generic participant number will be used 
for analyzing and reporting experimental results. Data will be stored on NPS 
computer and any hard copies will be stored in NPS offices.  
  
Points of Contact.  If you have any questions or comments about the research, or 
you experience an injury or have questions about any discomforts that you 
experience while taking part in this study please contact the Principal Investigator, 
Dr. Noah Myung, 831-656-2811, noah.myung@nps.edu. Questions about your 
rights as a research subject or any other concerns may be addressed to the Navy 
Postgraduate School IRB Chair, Dr. Larry Shattuck, 831-656-
2473, lgshattu@nps.edu. 
  
Statement of Consent. I have read the information provided above. I have been 
given the opportunity to ask questions and all the questions have been answered 
to my satisfaction. I have been provided a copy of this form for my records and I 
agree to participate in this study. I understand that by agreeing to participate in 
this research and signing this form, I do not waive any of my legal rights. I 
indicate my consent by selecting "YES" below. 
  
 41 
  * 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  Yes 
•  No 
3. Career Satisfaction 
Please answer the following questions based on your PERSONAL experience / 
opinion: 
Use the following scale to answer how the factors below affect/affected your 
decision to STAY on Active Duty and serve a Department Head Tour 
If "Other," please specify in the next question. 





























in the Navy 
       
Current Job 







       
Duty Station 





       
Geographic 





       
Career 
Opportunitie
s for Spouse 
/ Significant 
Other 
       
Patriotism 
       
Camaraderie 




       
Too Little 




































       
Quality of 
Life        
OPTEMPO 















       
Job Security 
       
Healthcare 








       
WTI 






       
Bonuses 
       
Other 
       
If you chose "Other" above, please specify here, and whether it makes you want 
to stay or leave the military: 
Please write your answer here: 
What is the most influential reason for you to STAY in the military TODAY (pick the 
one best answer)? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  Patriotism 
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•  Education opportunities 
•  Pay 
•  Pension/Retirement plan 
•  Job security 
•  Healthcare 
•  Job Satisfaction 
•  Other  
  
What is the most influential reason you would LEAVE the military TODAY (pick 
the one best answer)? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  Patriotism 
•  Education opportunities 
•  Pay 
•  Pension/Retirement plan 
•  Job security 
•  Healthcare 
•  Job Satisfaction 
•  Other  
  
Suppose you had the option of receiving $10,000 today (no strings attached). 
Further suppose that you had the option of instead receiving a larger dollar 
amount in the future. 
  
What is the minimum dollar amount you would need to receive 1 month from 
now for you to be willing to choose that over receiving the $10,000 today? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  $10,001-$10,100 
•  $10,101-$10,200 
 44 
•  $10,201-$10,300 
•  $10,301-$10,400 
•  $10,401-$10,500 
•  $10,501-$10,600 
•  $10,601-$10,700 
•  $10,701-$10,800 
•  $10,801-$10,900 
•  $10,901-$11,000 
•  $11,001-$12,000 
•  $12,001-$13,000 
•  $13,001-$14,000 
•  $14,001-$15,000 
•  Greater than $15,000 
What is the minimum dollar you would need to receive 1 year from now for you 
to be willing to choose that over receiving $10,000 today? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  $10,001-$11,000 
•  $11,001-$12,000 
•  $12,001-$13,000 
•  $13,001-$14,000 
•  $14,001-$15,000 
•  $15,001-$16,000 
•  $16,001-$17,000 
•  $17,001-$18,000 
•  $18,001-$19,000 
•  $19,001-$20,000 
•  Greater than $20,000 
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What is the minimum dollar you would need to receive 10 years from now for 
you to be willing to choose that over receiving $10,000 today? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  $10,001-$15,000 
•  $15,001-$20,000 
•  $20,001-$25,000 
•  $25,001-$30,000 
•  $30,001-$35,000 
•  $35,001-$40,000 
•  $40,001-$45,000 
•  $45,001-$50,000 
•  Greater than $50,000 
Would you be willing to take a pay cut to leave the military? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  Yes 
•  No 
Are you willing to work more hours as a civilian than you do now? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  Yes - Specify how many hours per week you are willing to work 
•  No 
Make a comment on your choice here: 
  
Please provide any additional comments in regard to questions in this section: 
Please write your answer here: 
  
4. Incentives for Retention 
Initial SWO Bonus 
The first bonus in a SWO's career is also referred to as the “SWOCP” (the 
initial bonus system), Revised Junior Critical Skills Retention Bonus 
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(RJCSRB, the revised system), or simply the Department Head Retention 
Bonus (DHRB, the newest system). DHRB is offered as an incentive to all 
eligible SWOs, who (in exchange for a cash bonus) agree to remain on active 
duty beyond their Minimum Service Requirement and complete two 
Department Head Tours. Bonus amounts have changed over time and are 
divided into multiple annual payments. 
  
Have you accepted or submitted a DHRB contract? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  Yes 
•  No 
What was the total amount for your DHRB contract? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  $75,000 
•  $105,000 
•  Other (please specify) 
•  I have not yet accepted the DHRB 
Make a comment on your choice here: 
  
How much of an effect does / did DHRB have on your decision to stay in the 
Navy? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  No affect at all 
•  Very little affect 
•  Somewhat affected 
•  Affected very much 
Assume the initial SWO bonus offered to you was $75,000; how likely would you 
be to accept the bonus? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  Very Unlikely (<15% chance of accepting the bonus) 
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•  Unlikely (16%-30% chance of accepting the bonus) 
•  Somewhat Unlikely (31%-45% chance of accepting the bonus) 
•  Neutral/ Uncertain (46%-55% chance of accepting the bonus) 
•  Somewhat Likely (56%-70% chance of accepting the bonus) 
•  Likely (71%-85% chance of accepting the bonus) 
•  Very Likely (>86% chance of accepting the bonus) 
How likely would you be to accept the bonus and agree to complete two 
Department Head Tours if the bonus offered to you was ________ (values 
below)? 



















































       
$25,000 
       
$50,000 
       
$75,000 
       
$100,000 
       
$125,000 
       
$150,000 
       
$175,000 
       
Please state how much you AGREE with the following statements about the SWO 
Department Head Bonus program: 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
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The following scenario is a hypothetic situation. 
  
Suppose the Navy replaces the current DHRB program with one that uses an 
auction-based system to determine the bonus amount for a specified number of 
contracts 
  
This auction-based format would work in the follow manner: Suppose there are 
100 SWOs eligible to receive retention bonuses and the Navy announces it will 
seek to retain 60 of those SWOs. Each SWO would individually and privately 
submit a bid with the minimum bonus amount he or she would be willing to 
accept in exchange for agreeing to complete two “Department Head Tours.” 
  
The Navy would compile all the bids and award the bonuses to the 60 SWOs with 
the lowest bids, but it would pay each of them the amount listed in the 61st lowest 
bid (e.g., if the 61stlowest bid was $75,000 then the 60 winning SWOs would each 
receive $75,000 even though each had offered to accept a lower amount). The 
remaining SWOs would not receive bonuses and would not be obligated to serve 
a “Department Head Tour.” 
  
This auction format is designed to be in a bidder’s best interest to bid truthfully. 
That is, there is no incentive to “game” the system by overbidding or 
underbidding. 
  
Assume you are in a group of 200 SWOs eligible to receive a retention bonus. If, 
under the system described above, the Navy’s goal is to retain 70 SWOs, what is 
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the amount you would likely submit for your bid (total bonus amount, replacing 
the current DHRB system)? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  $0 / no bonus required 
•  $5,000 
•  $10,000 
•  $15,000 
•  $20,000 
•  $25,000 
•  $30,000 
•  $35,000 
•  $40,000 
•  $45,000 
•  $50,000 
•  $55,000 
•  $60,000 
•  $65,000 
•  $70,000 
•  $75,000 
•  $80,000 
•  $85,000 
•  $90,000 
•  $95,000 
•  $100,000 
•  $105,000 
•  $110,000 
•  $115,000 
•  $120,000 
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•  $125,000 
•  $130,000 
•  $135,000 
•  $140,000 
•  $145,000 
•  $150,000 
•  $155,000 
•  $160,000 
•  $165,000 
•  $170,000 
•  $175,000 
•  More than $175,000 
•  I do not wish to be retained 
How well do you feel you understand the auction-based system described above 
(e.g., who is retained, how bonus amount is determined, how you should bid)? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  Clearly understand 
•  Sufficiently understand 
•  Somewhat understand 
•  Do not understand 
Please specify the location you would prefer / wanted to be stationed for your first 
“Department Head Tour”? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  Do not wish to serve as SWO DH 
•  CONUS East Coast 
•  CONUS West Coast 
•  Japan 
 51 
•  Rota 
•  Hawaii 
•  Other  
 What is the equivalent cash bonus you would be willing to forgo for the 
guarantee of serving in your preferred duty station? 
Only numbers may be entered in this field. 
 
Please write your answer here: 
  
 
The following situation is hypothetical. 
  
You can choose an alternative “Career Chart” from the following options in 
conjunction with the “SWO Bonus”: 
- Accelerated Warfighter [Warfare Tactics Instructor, or WTI] 
- Enhanced Readiness [First Shore duty, or specialized 
training/teaching/NPS/civilian grad ed] 
- Accelerated Skillset Building [delay 2nd sea duty to allow advanced skillset 
development at O-2 time] 
  
However, if you choose one of these options, you would be asked to give up a 
portion of your bonus.  
Consider each option individually. How much of the "SWO Bonus" would you be 
willing to give up to be guaranteed the ______ Career Chart? 
  Amount of bonus willing to forfeit to be guaranteed _____ Career Chart 
Accelerated Warfighter   
Enhanced Readiness   
Accelerated Skillset 
Building   
 What is the equivalent cash bonus you would be willing to forgo for the 
guarantee of choosing an alternative Career Chart as listed in the previous 
question? 
Only numbers may be entered in this field. 
 
Please write your answer here: 
  
In addition to the two options listed in previously (preferred duty station and 
alternate Career Chart), is there any other non-monetary incentive that might 
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increase your willingness to stay in the Navy after completing your initial service 
obligation?  
Please write your answer here: 
  
The Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission 
(MCRMC) made recommendations for the military retirement system that will be 
implemented in 2018. One cash payout portion of the report includes a 
continuation pay that will be dispersed at Year of Service (YOS) 12. This bonus 
will equal 2.5 times monthly basic pay, plus a potential additional pay to be 
provided by service, with an associated obligation to remain on active duty for 
four more years.  
At YOS 12, you expect to be an O-4. In 2016 dollars, you expect a monthly base 
pay of $7,081.50, meaning the minimum continuation pay amount would be 
$17,703.75. 
  
Assuming your continuation pay offered at the 12 year mark is $18,000, how 
likely would you be to accept the bonus in exchange for a 4 year commitment?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  Very Unlikely (<15% chance of accepting the bonus) 
•  Unlikely (16%-30% chance of accepting the bonus) 
•  Somewhat Unlikely (31%-45% chance of accepting the bonus) 
•  Neutral/ Uncertain (46%-55% chance of accepting the bonus) 
•  Somewhat Likely (56%-70% chance of accepting the bonus) 
•  Likely (71%-85% chance of accepting the bonus) 
•  Very Likely (>86% chance of accepting the bonus) 
What is the minimum amount you would accept to stay for the 4 year obligation? 
Only numbers may be entered in this field. 
 
Please write your answer here: 
  
Are you aware of the SWOCS Bonus, which is offered after completing two 
Department Head tours (at about the 12 YOS mark), totaling approximately 
$46,000 paid over 3 years? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  Yes 
•  No 
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The following is a hypothetical situation based on a $75,000 DHRB contract. 
  
The current bonus structure offered to SWOs is a combination of DHRB, 
continuation pay, and SWOCS. The payout schedule is below, presuming 
continuation pay is the minimum and SWOCS is on a multi-year contract: 
  Years of Commissioned Service 
Bonus 
Amount 
  4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
DHRB $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000       
SWOCS             $22,000 $12,000 $12,000 
Continuation 
Pay                 $18,000 
Total Payout Over Time: $139,000 
 
  
Assuming this payout schedule and amounts, and you were to accept DHRB, 
continuation pay, and SWOCS, would you prefer the current payout schedule or a 
one-time lump sum payment at the first opportunity? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  The Current Schedule 
•  One-time lump sum (specify the amount in the next question) 
If you chose "One-time lump sum," what is the minimum amount you would 
accept? 
Only numbers may be entered in this field. 
 
Please write your answer here: 
  
DHRB and SWOCS are linked to points in the SWO career, specifically post-
Division Officer tours and post-Department Head tours. Continuation pay is paid 
at the 12 YOS mark for all of DoD, with a minimum amount of approximately 
$18,000 and a changing upper bound from year to year depending on your 
community's  retention needs. 
  
Which bonus most affects your choice to be retained? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  DHRB 
•  SWOCS 
•  Continuation pay 
 54 
5. Career Background 
FIRST DIVISION OFFICER TOUR 
The following questions are in regard to your first Division Officer Tour: 
What is your parent community? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  DDG 
•  CG 
•  FFG 
•  LSD 
•  LHA 
•  LSD 
•  LPD 
•  MCM 
•  PC 
•  RIVERINE 
•  Other  
 Where were you stationed / homeported for your first Division Officer Tour? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  HAMPTON ROADS 
•  MAYPORT 
•  ROTA 
•  BAHRAIN 
•  SAN DIEGO 
•  YOKOSUKA 
•  SASEBO 
•  HAWAII 
•  EVERETT 
•  SINGAPORE 
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•  Other  
 What department did you belong to for the longest amount of time during your 
first Division Officer Tour? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  ENGINEERING 
•  OPERATIONS 
•  COMBAT SYSTEMS 
•  WEAPONS 
•  DECK (AMPHIB) 
•  ADMINISTRATION 
•  NAVIGATION 
•  SUPPLY 
•  Not yet assigned a division 
•  Other  
 How many months onboard did it take for you to qualify as a Surface Warfare 
Officer (SWO)?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  9-11 
•  12-14 
•  15-17 
•  18-20 
•  21-23 
•  24 or greater 
•  Not yet qualified as SWO 
How many total hours were you questioned by Department Heads/XO/CO in a 
formal setting for your SWO board before qualifying (do not count murder boards 
or pre-boards)? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
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•  1-2 
•  2-3 
•  3-4 
•  4 or more 
•  Not yet qualified as SWO 
Rank how the CO who qualified you SWO was considered in terms of rigor: 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  Very difficult to qualify 
•  Somewhat difficult to qualify 
•  Neutral 
•  Somewhat easy to qualify 
•  Very easy to qualify 
•  Not yet qualified as SWO 
Did you receive a Department Head recommendation by the end of your first 
Division Officer Tour? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  Yes 
•  No 
•  First tour not yet complete 
If you were to rank your professional quality against your peers, what tier would 
you fall into? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  Top 5% 
•  Top 10% 
•  Top 25% 
•  Top 50% 
•  Top 75% 
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SECOND DIVISION OFFICER TOUR 
The following questions are in regard to your second Division Officer Tour: 
What is your parent community? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  Not yet assigned a Second Divo Tour 
•  DDG 
•  CG 
•  FFG 
•  LSD 
•  LHA 
•  LSD 
•  LPD 
•  MCM 
•  PC 
•  RIVERINE 
•  DESRON 
•  Other  
 Where were you stationed / homeported for your second Division Officer Tour? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  Not yet assigned a Second Divo Tour 
•  HAMPTON ROADS 
•  MAYPORT 
•  ROTA 
•  BAHRAIN 
•  SAN DIEGO 
•  YOKOSUKA 
•  SASEBO 
•  HAWAII 
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•  EVERETT 
•  SINGAPORE 
•  Other  
 What was the highest qualification you earned by the end of your second 
Division Officer Tour? The list below is constructed from lowest to highest 
qualification. 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  Not yet assigned a Second Divo Tour 
•  OOD 
•  CDO 
•  SUWC/Air 
•  EOOW 
•  TAO (non-AEGIS) 
•  TAO (AEGIS) 
•  Other  
 What was your billet during your second Division Officer Tour? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  Not yet assigned a Second Divo Tour 
•  NAV 
•  ASWO 
•  FPO 
•  FCO 
•  DCA 
•  TRAINO 
•  MPA 
•  NGLO 
•  Staff 
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•  OTHER 
•  Other  
 How many deployments (>90 days) have you completed? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  0 
•  1 
•  2 
•  3 
•  4 
•  5 
•  Other  
 Demographics 
What is your designator? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  1110 
•  1160 
•  Other  
 What is your Year Group? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  2000 or prior 
•  2001 
•  2002 
•  2003 
•  2004 
•  2005 
•  2006 
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•  2007 
•  2008 
•  2009 
•  2010 
•  2011 
•  2012 
•  2013 
•  2014 
•  2015 
•  2016 
•  Other  
 What was the calendar year that you qualified as SWO (i.e., "pinned")? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  Not yet a qualified SWO 
•  2007 or prior 
•  2008 
•  2009 
•  2010 
•  2011 
•  2012 
•  2013 
•  2014 
•  2015 
•  2016 
What is your current paygrade? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
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•  W-2 
•  W-3 
•  W-4 
•  O-1 
•  O-1E 
•  O-2 
•  O-2E 
•  O-3 
•  O-3E 
•  O-4 
•  O-5 
•  O-6 
What was your commissioning source? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  USNA 
•  NROTC 
•  OCS 
•  STA-21 
•  Other  
 What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  Associate's Degree 
•  Bachelor’s Degree 
•  Some Postgraduate Education 
•  Master’s Degree 
•  Doctorate 
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•  Other  
 Please select any additional qualifications / experience you have earned (select all 
that apply): 
Please choose all that apply: 
•  CDO 
•  JPME 
•  OOD 
•  SWO Pin 
•  TAO 
•  WTI 
•  Flag Aide 
•  GSA / IA 
• Other:  
 What is your gender? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  Female 
•  Male 
What is your marital status? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  Single / Never Married 
•  Married / Civil Union 
•  Divorced / Separated 
•  Widowed 
•  Other  
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Have you ever failed a PFA (either BCA or PRT portion)? 
Please choose only one of the following: 
•  Yes - Specify how many 
•  No 
Make a comment on your choice here: 
  
Please add any additional comments you wish to share with the researchers: 
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